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Brexit: The Causes and the Consequences
Hannah E. Day
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
 This argumentative paper addresses the question, why did the British public vote 
to leave the European Union in the June 2016 referendum? “Brexit” captivated the at-
tention of countless scholars, journalists and political leaders, as most of the world was 
shocked that the “Leave” campaign, spearheaded by the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP), ultimately won out over the “Remain” campaign. Since the Brexit vote, 
debates have arisen, as perplexed outsiders attempt to discern the factors that contributed to 
51.9% of referendum participants voting to leave the EU. I examine two dominant causes 
of the Brexit vote: first, the pervasiveness of anti-immigration rhetoric and sentiments; 
second, the powerful argument presented for economic independence. I discuss how the 
"Leave" campaign used and manipulated these arguments to ignite Euroscepticism and fear 
in the voters. After considering the causes of the vote, I analyze potential consequences of 
Brexit; specifically, how the restriction of the freedom of movement will impact the British 
economy and the possibility of another referendum on the independence of Scotland.
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Introduction	
 People end relationships for a wide variety of reasons: a lack of trust, different in-
terests, miscommunications or fear of commitment. All of these reasons are evident in the 
most devastating, high-profile breakup of 2016: Brexit. On June 23, 2016, the citizens of 
the United Kingdom voted to break up with the European Union. In a referendum that 
72.2% of the population participated in, 51.9% of people voted for leaving the EU (“EU 
Referendum Results,” 2016). To say the world was shocked would be an understatement. 
When former Prime Minister David Cameron announced in 2015 that there would be an 
in-out referendum by the end of 2017, other countries and many British people dismissed 
it in light of the many benefits of EU membership (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). While the 
United Kingdom had never historically been the strongest supporter of European integra-
tion, many thought that the logistical nightmare of leaving and the subsequent costs would 
be strong enough to deter voters from the out vote. However, in the six months following 
Cameron’s pledge for a referendum, the Leave campaign, championed by former London 
Mayor Boris Johnson, spearheaded a strong offensive against the economic and political ef-
fects of membership in the EU. Ultimately, in July 2016, the Leave argument won the votes 
of the majority of referendum participants. 
 The most pressing question that remains almost two years after the vote is, why 
Brexit? Why, against the warnings of countless domestic and international scholars, econo-
mists and political leaders, would the British public vote to leave the European Union? 
This question has captivated the attention and research of political analysts across the world, 
who point to a myriad of factors motivating UK citizens to vote “leave.” In this paper, I 
argue that the most important reasons for the results of the Brexit vote were the rhetoric 
surrounding immigration and British economic independence. These were the dominant 
arguments used by the Leave campaign to instill Euroscepticism and fear in the minds of 
voters.
 The rest of this paper is divided into four parts. I will first discuss the importance of 
the pervasiveness of anti-immigration rhetoric in igniting fears and hostilities in the minds 
of British voters against the EU policy of free movement of people and against refugees. 
Second, I will outline the Leave campaign’s powerful argument for economic independence 
from the EU, an organization they insisted was hindering the potential growth of the Unit-
ed Kingdom. Third, I will examine two potential consequences over the next 10-20 years 
for the UK of leaving the European Union, specifically of the restriction of the freedom of 
movement and possibility of losing Scotland in an independence referendum. Fourth and 
lastly, I will discuss unanswered questions about Brexit and my plans for future research on 
the perception of Scottish students on the United Kingdom and the European Union. 
Immigration
 The Leave campaign capitalized on British fears of more and more immigrants 
coming to the UK, whether as EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe or as refugees 
from the Middle East and Northern Africa. Both Theresa May and David Cameron openly 
opposed the free movement of labor, which is guaranteed within the European Economic 
Community. They argued that over the past several years, migrants from Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe were taking advantage of state-funded services and putting a strain on social ser-
vices, such as schools and health care (Dominiczak, 2013). Although the refugee crisis began 
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after the 2011 Arab Spring, beginning in 2015, hundreds of thousands of people, primarily 
fleeing political persecution in Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq, started making the treacherous 
journey across the Mediterranean to seek refuge in Europe. While the vast majority of refu-
gees remained in neighboring countries such as Turkey and Lebanon, the European Union 
also felt the weight of the rapid influx of refugees (Akbarzadeh & Conduit, 2016, p. 10). 
The northern spread of refugees contributed to the rise of right-wing, nationalist parties, 
such as the United Kingdom Independence Party. The United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP), a populist party and the strongest backer of the Leave campaign, fueled anti-
EU and anti-immigration sentiments (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 6). The Leave campaign 
constructed a panic-inducing narrative of the flow of EU citizens and the refugee crisis. The 
fear in British citizens justified xenophobia as a necessary measure to protect British security 
and economic stability.
 Supporters of the Leave campaign argued that high levels of immigration to the 
UK would mean fewer jobs, lower wages and the inadequate provision of public services for 
British citizens. In the weeks leading up to the referendum, reports from the EU surfaced 
that there were 2.1 million EU nationals working in Britain. This information was skewed 
by the Leave campaign and presented as if immigrants were stealing 2.1 million jobs away 
from the British and driving down wages. However, jobs are not a zero-sum game because 
even if an immigrant takes a job, Travis (2016) claimed that “it doesn’t mean he or she 
[British worker] won’t find another one that may have been created directly or indirectly, 
as a result of immigration.” Former Prime Minister David Cameron played on fears of eco-
nomic insecurity due to immigrants when he issued a report on immigration that “indicated 
that there were indeed fears that the British social system could be exploited by EU immi-
grants (Welfens, 2017, p. 147).” Cameron pinpointed immigrants as the cause of shortages 
of schools and appointments with general practitioners and used them as a scapegoat for the 
undersupply of local services (Stewart & Mason, 2016). The belief that immigrants were 
stealing jobs and services caught the attention of the British public and heightened xeno-
phobic feelings. 
 In order to establish distrust and fear of non-EU immigrants, the Leave campaign 
presented them as a threat to personal and national security. Prime Minister David Cameron 
described refugees as a foreign invasion or a “swarm” desperately trying to gain access to 
Britain (Taylor, 2016). In a more dramatic way, Nigel Farage, a member of the European 
Parliament and the UK Independence Party, unveiled an anti-migrant poster approximately 
one month before the referendum vote portraying a line of mostly non-white migrants with 
the slogan “Breaking point: the EU has failed us all” (Stewart & Mason, 2016). The poster, 
which was compared to Nazi propaganda of migrants, was condemned by the official Vote 
Leave campaign as an extreme exploitation of the struggles of refugees. Yet, this type of 
image was just one of the more stark examples of exploiting British fears of immigrants in 
order to further the Leave campaign. According to Inglehart and Norris (2016), anti-EU 
advocates pointed to bombings in Dusseldorf and the attack at the Berlin Christmas Market 
as the hallmarks of refugee behavior, necessitating the closure of the flow of people into the 
United Kingdom (p. 11). Even though these terrorist attacks represent a miniscule propor-
tion of refugee behavior, these were the images that the British were bombarded with lead-
ing up to the referendum. 
 While there were many reasons that the British voted to leave the European Union, 
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the issue of immigration was one of the most important. Hall (2016) explained that post-
election polls found that “nearly 75 percent of prospective ‘leave’ voters cited immigration 
as the most important issue of the referendum.” Immigration became such a divisive factor 
because it was the strongest argument on the side of the Leave campaign, especially among 
voters who had minimal interactions with immigrants in their daily lives. Areas with high 
concentrations of immigrants were less likely to vote Leave because they had experienced 
the positive effects of these populations (Johnston, 2017). Questions and fears of immigrants 
were rising quickly from 2015 into 2016 as the number of refugees entering the European 
Union continued to increase. Immigration was such a pervasive topic that Welfens (2017) 
reported that the “subjective estimation of the share of immigrants in the UK amongst the 
British population was about three times as high as the actual share really is” (p. 70). Leave 
voters wanted to regain control over immigration to lessen the number of people, especially 
refugees and workers from East and Central Europe, that were entering into the United 
Kingdom. 
Economic	Independence	
 Following the theme of regaining control, the other most pronounced reason that 
the Brexit Leave campaign ultimately won over Remain was because of the narrative of 
reestablishing British economic control. While there are obvious economic benefits of EU 
membership for the United Kingdom, such as boosting trade by eliminating barriers, the 
Leave campaign framed EU membership as a direct hindrance to the growth of the national 
economy. They claimed that “Britain was being held back by the EU, which they said im-
posed too many rules on business and charged billions of pounds a year in membership fees 
for little in return” (Hunt & Wheeler, 2017). Armstrong (2017) asserted that it did not even 
matter that the figures the Leave campaign cited, like that membership of the EU was cost-
ing taxpayers £350 per week, were incorrect (p. 86). Frightening statistics like these were 
plastered on posters and buses, so it was difficult to escape the idea that the EU was limit-
ing the British economy. The Leave campaign argued that by taking back domestic agency 
over their trade deals and restructuring their economic framework from within, the United 
Kingdom would see growth of businesses and greater economic stability.
 The European Debt Crisis, which began in 2009, was another example used by 
the Leave campaign to condemn the ability of the EU to stimulate economic growth and 
prevent downturn. While Britain was never a part of the Eurozone, the Leave campaign 
cited the massive debt, high unemployment and stagnation of Eurozone economies, specifi-
cally Greece and Spain, as evidence of the incompetence of EU economic policies (Hamdy, 
2016). Moreover, since the financial meltdown and ensuing Eurozone crisis, Clarke, Good-
win and Whiteley (2016) argued that “people’s judgments about the state of the national 
economy have become increasingly important for explaining their reactions to the EU.” 
This is evident because the most economically vulnerable populations, including those with 
no higher education and those earning less than £1,200 a month were most likely to vote 
Leave (“Brexit Vote: The Breakdown,” 2016).  They were the people who felt that the 
United Kingdom was falling behind economically, especially in comparison to the econom-
ic powerhouse in the region, Germany, and that pushing blame onto the EU would solve 
their problems. Leave voters wanted greater economic independence because they widely 
discounted the benefits of EU membership and focused on its recent failures to stimulate 
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growth. 
  In general, Leave supporters adopted what Armstrong describes as a “transaction-
alist” approach to EU membership (Armstrong, 2017, p. 87). The transactionalist approach 
deemed that a relationship with the EU was only worthwhile if British citizens were directly 
benefiting. This was a persuasive tool within working class voters because they felt directly 
threatened by the open flow of EU migrants that were occupying poorly paid occupations 
and supposedly driving down wages. As earlier discussed, while the number of EU workers 
in Britain has increased over the past few years, the falls in wages are not due to the influx 
of workers, but rather the global financial crisis and slow recovery (Travis, 2016). It did not 
much matter that the rhetoric presented by the Leave campaign on job loss and depressed 
wages was untrue. It stoked fear in the minds of working class voters and drove them to 
accept the idea that economic independence from the European Union was the best way to 
ensure that their jobs would be safe. 
 Some journalists and scholars refer to Brexit as a “protest vote” because older, 
less-educated and poorer people turned up to vote and tended to vote Leave (Cross, 2016). 
The argument for economic independence was most effective among those individuals 
because, in the opinion of Senior Research Fellow at the Corvinus University of Budapest 
Zsolt Darvas (2016), “high inequality and poverty undermine personal well-being and social 
cohesion, and can also boost protest votes in referenda and elections.” The people working 
in traditional industries such as manufacturing and seaside jobs were feeling left behind by 
the pace of the increasingly globalized economy. They were struggling financially and the 
European Union was easy target to place blame onto. The Leave campaign honed in on the 
insecurities of these people and convinced them that greater economic independence would 
prevent the rapid flow of migrant workers, protect the jobs of native Brits and restore British 
economic fruitfulness. 
Consequences
 It is difficult to predict what the long-term effects of Brexit will be for the United 
Kingdom. One potential consequence over the next 10-20 years will be economic chal-
lenges because of the disruption of one of the four founding principles of the EU: the free 
movement of people. Over the past three decades, Britain’s open labor market drove it 
to become a hub of international business, as both unskilled and skilled workers filled the 
entry-level jobs that Brits were not fulfilling. Cosmopolitan London was built by the Poles, 
French, Czechs and Italians, and its large service sector will not thrive without their con-
tinued labor, which is evident in that it is already suffering macroeconomic effects due to 
uncertainty surrounding the referendum (Blockmans & Emerson, 2016). Moreover, while 
many predict that “taking back control of the borders” will ultimately lead to an arrange-
ment similar to the members of the European Economic Area, in the short-term, Britain’s 
younger workers will be punished by the restriction of their movement into other EU na-
tions (Allen, Oltermann, Borger & Nelsen, 2015). They depend on the jobs in Germany 
and France that may no longer be available to them. These are just a few of the potential 
consequences for the United Kingdom over the next several decades by restricting the free-
dom of movement.
 One of the most distinct regional voting results was in Scotland, in which only 
38% of the population that participated in the referendum voted Leave, compared to the 
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52% of overall Leave voters (Goodwin & Heath, 2016, p. 324). In the month leading up 
to the Brexit referendum, Nicola Sturgeon, the current First Minister of Scotland, was de-
manding a second referendum for Scottish independence from the UK. However, since her 
Scottish National Party (SNP) suffered losses in this year’s election, she has backed down 
from referendum demands and the Scottish and UK governments are working to strike a 
Withdrawal Bill (Carrell & Stewart, 2017). While progress has been made with British and 
Scottish reconciliation, a referendum for Scottish independence is nevertheless possible be-
cause both Sturgeon and the Scottish Brexit minister Mike Russell have made it clear that 
they want Scotland to remain in the EU. Their desire for Scottish independence will only 
be exacerbated if the EU Withdrawal Bill ends up being a power grab that concentrates 
power in Westminster. There are few possible situations in which Brexit proves to be any-
thing other than another division between Britain and Scotland.
Questions	and	Future	Research	
 Brexit has been a slow and painful breakup. Though there is technically an end 
in sight, with the April 2019 withdrawal deadline, Brexit is still in the tedious, uneasy first 
stage of establishing the principles of the breakup. There are many unanswered questions, 
like can Brexit be reversed? If a deal for Brexit is met, then what happens to British citizens 
living in the EU, and EU citizens living in the UK? Will the UK be able to be a member of 
the Single Market? Do they want to be a part of the Single Market if it involves paying fees? 
Also, what happens if a Brexit deal is not met by April 2019? What is Theresa May willing 
to give up in the next year of negotiations? The European Union and the United Kingdom 
are in the awkward phase of the breakup where they are trying to figure out if they can 
continue to work together, especially for the sake of their mutual friends. Negotiations for 
a post-Brexit settlement are underway, but there is uncertainty about the UK’s short- and 
long-term goals of these deals and the question of a financial settlement. 
 I hope to continue my research on Brexit when I study abroad at the University of 
Glasgow in the Fall of 2018. I plan on developing a descriptive study by interviewing native 
Scots attending the University of Glasgow to learn three new pieces of information. First, 
why do they think that “Brexit” became a reality? One of the weaknesses of my current 
research is that I did not have the opportunity to speak with citizens of the United King-
dom to directly hear what they were exposed to throughout the Brexit campaigns and if the 
rhetoric surrounding the problems of immigration and economic influence had any impact 
on why they voted the way they did. Many of the scholars I have referenced throughout this 
paper argued that the pervasiveness of anti-immigrant sentiments and arguments for greater 
economic control shaped the votes in the referendum. I would like to speak directly to vot-
ers and see if they saw or felt the influence of the Leave campaign and if it at all influenced 
them. The second goal of my study is to discover how the students feel about being part of 
the United Kingdom in light of Brexit. Do they believe there should be another referendum 
for Scottish independence? If so, do they think that the results would be any different from 
the referendum held in 2014? Though I can learn from the news much of what is happen-
ing at the Brexit negotiating table, that tells me little about how Scots are feeling about the 
process of Brexit and more generally in continuing to be a part of the United Kingdom. The 
third and final goal of my study is to find out why in Scotland the Remain vote won out 
over the Leave vote. Most studies of Brexit have focused on the Leave argument, but since 
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the majority of Scots voted to stay in the European Union, I would like to know why their 
perceptions of the EU differed from those of the majority of the voter turnout in England. 
 Though some pessimistic journalists described Brexit as the demise of the EU, it is 
unlikely that Brexit will cause a domino effect, in which other member states hold referen-
dums and a majority vote to leave the European Union. However, the result has shaken the 
confidence of the once solid, internally favored political and economic bloc. Stokes, Wike 
and Manevich (2017) reported that while a majority of survey participants do not believe 
their country should leave the EU, many support a referendum on membership. Support 
for a national referendum was particularly steep in Spain (65%) and France (61%), but still 
more than 55% of individuals in both nations hold a favorable view of the EU. Nonethe-
less, we must not ignore the obvious discontent among millions of EU citizens, whether it 
be regarding immigration, economic struggle, or a number of other challenges the EU has 
faced in the past decade. Brexit was certainly a shocking, collective declaration of anti-EU 
sentiment, but the feelings expressed by voters are not so different from millions of other 
EU citizens. Brexit is a warning to the rest of the European Union that it must recognize 
and address the concerns of its citizens, but not with populism or referendums, because 
those turn into a real headache. 
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